Exposing the Middlemen in Rising Drug Costs: Modifying Safe Harbor  Protections for Pharmacy Benefit Manager Rebates Under Federal  Anti-Kickback Statues by Gore, Abigail
[297] 
ABIGAIL GORE*
Exposing the Middlemen in Rising 
Drug Costs: Modifying Safe Harbor 
Protections for Pharmacy Benefit 
Manager Rebates Under Federal  
Anti-Kickback Statutes  
Introduction ...................................................................................... 298 
I. How Pharmaceutical Middlemen Profit ................................ 300 
A. Pharmacy Benefit Managers .......................................... 300 
B. Rebates ........................................................................... 302 
C. Federal Enforcement Mechanisms ................................. 305 
1. Prior Legislative Initiatives ...................................... 305
2. The Anti-Kickback Statute ....................................... 306
3. The Discount Safe Harbor ........................................ 307
II. Recent Federal Attempts to Remove Safe Harbor
Applicability .......................................................................... 309 
III. The Case for (Somewhat) Preserving Rebates ...................... 313
A. Unintended Consequences ............................................. 314 
B. Working Within the Anti-Kickback Statute: 
Detangling Administrative Fees from List Prices .......... 316 
1. Lessons from the Private Sector: A Case Analysis
of Caterpillar Inc. ..................................................... 317 
2. Lessons from the Private Sector: Contracting
Around PBMs .......................................................... 319 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Oregon School of Law; B.S., University of Puget
Sound. Thank you to Professor Elizabeth Frost and the staff of Oregon Law Review for all 
the thoughtful guidance and feedback, and to my nephews, David and Colton, for teaching 
me how to use an EpiPen. 
298 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 297 
3. Lessons from the Private Sector: Preserving a Role
for PBMs .................................................................. 320 
C. State Regulation of PBMs .............................................. 322 
Conclusion ....................................................................................... 323 
INTRODUCTION 
harmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) have, until very recently, 
largely escaped public scrutiny or possibly even public 
consciousness. Although relatively unknown to the average American 
healthcare consumer, specialized healthcare companies known as 
PBMs play a direct role in negotiating pharmaceutical drug prices for 
more than 266 million Americans.1 
Rising pharmaceutical costs, on the other hand, invaded the public 
consciousness in 2016 when a dramatic increase in the price of 
pharmaceutical company Mylan’s EpiPen sparked outrage across the 
country.2 In 2007, Mylan bought the rights to produce the EpiPen, an 
autoinjector that delivers epinephrine to those experiencing an 
anaphylactic reaction.3 When Mylan acquired the rights to the EpiPen, 
a pack of two EpiPens cost consumers around $100. By 2016, a pack 
of two EpiPens had risen by an inexplicable 450%, totaling more than 
$600 per pack.4 
Those consumers battling allergies and rising drug costs were not 
alone. Diabetes patients have experienced a doubling in the price of 
insulin since 2011, with some consumers’ out-of-pocket costs 
increasing from $40 to $600 for a six-week supply.5 Parents of children 
suffering from a catastrophic form of epilepsy known as infantile 
spasms also recently saw the price of Acthar, which stops infantile 
spasms, catapult from $1,600 per vial in the year 2000 to more than 
1 Cole Werble, Prescription Drug Pricing: Pharmacy Benefit Managers, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171409.000178/ 
full/healthpolicybrief_178.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LDC-QBYJ]. 
2 Tara Parker-Pope & Rachel Rabkin Peachman, EpiPen Price Rise Sparks Concern for 
Allergy Sufferers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016, 6:05 PM), https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2016/08/22/epipen-price-rise-sparks-concern-for-allergy-sufferers/ [https://perma.cc/ 
WG97-G2M9].  
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Denise Roland & Peter Loftus, Insulin Prices Soar While Drugmakers’ Share Stays 
Flat, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2016, 5:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/insulin-prices-
soar-while-drugmakers-share-stays-flat-1475876764 [https://perma.cc/R52C-TXQE]. 
P 
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$39,000 per vial by 2018.6 These crippling price increases were met 
with suspicion by journalists who raised the question of whether the 
increasing costs were not organic but driven in part by the role that 
PBMs play in the healthcare industry.7  
Slowly, the PBM industry is being forced out of its comfortable, 
relative obscurity. The attention on PBMs has led to congressional 
hearings, legislation at both the federal and state levels, and a reignited 
debate regarding the ways in which the government should intervene 
in the pharmaceutical drug pricing crisis.8  
Most recently, the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) has further increased public awareness of PBMs’ important role 
in drug pricing by proposing rule changes that will decimate the most 
important aspect of PBMs’ business model: the rebates they negotiate 
with drug manufacturers.9 However, these rebates have also been 
championed as one of the only ways the healthcare marketplace can 
force down drug prices that are otherwise almost exclusively controlled 
by drug manufacturers themselves.10 
This Comment will first describe PBMs, drug rebate pricing, and the 
federal statutory scheme that governs PBMs’ current practices. In Part 
II, this Comment will outline recent federal rules proposed to eliminate 
PBMs’ current rebate practices. In Part III, this Comment will argue 
that although the rebate structure that PBMs operate under is ripe for 
reform, the scorched-earth regulatory approach recently proposed by 
the Department of Health and Human Services goes too far and may 
6 Wayne Drash, Anatomy of a 97,000% Drug Price Hike: One Family’s Fight to Save 
Their Son, CNN (June 29, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/29/health/acthar-
mallinckrodt-questcor-price-hike-trevor-foltz/index.html [https://perma.cc/TY2M-DKK5]. 
7 Roland & Loftus, supra note 5. 
8 Shradha Singh & Yasmeen Abutaleb, U.S. Congress Invites Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers to Third Drug Pricing Hearing, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2019, 6:12 PM), https:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-drugpricing/u-s-congress-invites-pharmacy-
benefit-managers-to-third-drug-pricing-hearing-idUSKBN1QU04O [https://perma.cc/ 
FKR6-QN9L]; Colleen Becker, PBM Legislation: States Regulating Pharmaceutical 
Benefit Managers, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, (May 16, 2019), http://www.ncsl. 
org/research/health/pbm-state-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/U7QF-EJRQ]. 
9 Removal of Safe Harbor Protection for Rebates Involving Prescription 
Pharmaceuticals, 84 Fed. Reg. 2340 (proposed Feb. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Removal of Safe 
Harbor Protection] (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).  
10 VISANTE, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS (PBMS): GENERATING SAVINGS FOR 
PLAN SPONSORS AND CONSUMERS 3 (2011), https://www.pcmanet.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/08/pr-dated-09-19-11-pbms-savings-study-2011-final-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX6C-
K3DH]. 
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instead end up hurting those at the heart of this debate: American 
patients. Instead, supporters of increased PBM regulation in the current 
administration, and on both sides of the aisle in Congress, should 
channel their energy for drug pricing reform into moderate oversight 
regulations that do not place the entire PBM industry, and the discounts 
they are currently responsible for, at risk. 
I 
HOW PHARMACEUTICAL MIDDLEMEN PROFIT 
A. Pharmacy Benefit Managers 
When legislators began the process of reforming pharmaceutical 
costs, targeting a single aspect of the drug industry for reform proved 
difficult.11 No sector of the complex web of healthcare companies 
involved in drug distribution has stepped up to claim responsibility for 
the rising costs. Health plans, drug manufacturers, wholesalers, and 
pharmacies all seem content with the strategy of shifting blame to each 
other.12 Although the most obvious target for reform may be the drug 
companies who control drugs’ patents, recent proposals for reform at 
the state and federal levels have focused on a lesser-known players in 
the drug delivery system: Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs).13  
Although little known to most consumers, PBMs administer drugs 
for health plans, including commercial and government employee 
plans, which cumulatively cover more than 266 million Americans.14 
Within the field, three publicly traded PBMs—Express Scripts, 
OptumRx (a subsidiary of UnitedHealth Group), and CVS Caremark (a 
subsidiary of the CVS drugstore chain) represent almost 70% of the 
266 million Americans and collect more than $200 billion per year to 
manage these plans.15  
11 Avik Roy, Drug Companies, Not ‘Middlemen’, Are Responsible for High Drug 
Prices, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2018, 11:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/ 
2018/10/22/drug-companies-are-responsible-for-high-drug-prices-not-middlemen/ 
#5f4b8ce04947 [https://perma.cc/M48Q-M6EF]. 
12 Id. 
13 Nathaniel Weixel, Top Republicans Concerned Over Impact of Potential Trump Drug 
Rule, THE HILL (Aug. 9, 2018, 1:08 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/401102-
lawmakers-concerned-over-economic-cost-of-potential-drug-rebate-rule [https://perma.cc/ 
B6ZJ-FJZ8]. 
14 Thomas A. Hemphill, The “Troubles” with Pharmacy Benefit Managers, 40 
REGULATION (Spring 2017), at 14, 14. 
15 Michael Hiltzik, How ‘Price-Cutting’ Middlemen Are Making Crucial Drugs Vastly 
More Expensive, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/ 
hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-pbm-drugs-20170611-story.html [https://perma.cc/HJ7Q-TVJ4]. 
2020] Exposing the Middlemen in Rising Drug Costs: Modifying  301 
Safe Harbor Protections for Pharmacy Benefit Manager Rebates 
Under Federal Anti-Kickback Statutes
A patient’s actual interaction with a PBM begins when they go to a 
pharmacy to pick up a prescription drug covered by their health plan. 
When a patient enters a pharmacy with a prescription, the pharmacist 
looks up whether the patient has prescription drug coverage. If the 
pharmacist confirms that the patient has prescription drug coverage, the 
pharmacist fills the prescription, and the patient then pays the requisite 
co-pay, depending on the patient’s own healthcare plan. The rest of the 
cost of the drug is then covered by the patient’s health plan. Although 
this process is well known to American consumers of prescription 
drugs, many are unaware that the price they pay has been directly 
negotiated by the PBM their pharmacy contracts with.16  
PBMs act as middlemen between manufacturers and those who pay 
for the medications, such as insurers.17 Each PBM usually acts on 
behalf of multiple private insurer clients. PBMs market their role as 
cost-savers, building up a large enough client base and leveraging their 
market share of consumers to negotiate a better market price with the 
drugs’ manufacturers.18  
PBMs also hold leverage when negotiating with drug manufacturers 
because of the “formularies” of drugs they offer to their clients.19 A 
PBM’s formulary is essentially a hierarchical list of approved drugs 
their client pharmacies can then prescribe,20 meaning PBMs put 
together lists of drugs, based on pricing and treatment options, that a 
health plan may cover. Then, when patients arrive at a pharmacy to 
fulfill a prescription, pharmacists use this list to make sure the patient’s 
health plan covers the drug.21 This list includes not only the names of 
drugs approved and purchased by the PBMs but also the methodology 
a doctor or insurer must use to prescribe medicine to their patients.22 
Therefore, a PBM has significant control over which drugs a consumer 
has access to. This list is continually updated based on the deals a PBM 
16 Joanna Shepherd, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: The Regulation of Pharmacy 
Benefit Managers by a Market Adversary, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 5 (2013). 
17 STAN FINKELSTEIN & PETER TEMIN, REASONABLE RX: SOLVING THE DRUG PRICE 
CRISIS 24 (2008). 
18 Shepherd, supra note 16, at 5. 
19 Hemphill, supra note 14, at 14. 
20 CVS CAREMARK, FORMULARY DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT AT CVS 
CAREMARK (2018), https://www.caremark.com/portal/asset/FormDevMgmt.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/CT8N-EYW4]. 
21 Joseph C. Bourne & Ellen M. Ahrens, Healthcare’s Invisible Giants: Pharmacy 
Benefit Managers, FED. LAW 50 (2013). 
22 Id. 
302 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 297 
makes, and drug companies fight to be on approved formulary lists so 
their medications can be prescribed to large swaths of consumers.23 
PBMs, such as CVS Caremark, say they use formularies to create 
affordable and clinically sound plans and to help manage drug spending 
by guiding the appropriate selection and use of drug therapy.24 
Regardless of the arguable merits of the formulary system, the 
inherent competitive nature of formularies makes them susceptible to 
manipulation by drug manufacturer pricing practices and thus an area 
future regulations may focus on. 
B. Rebates 
PBMs typically receive a majority of their profit from both 
administrative fees and the rebates they collect from drug 
manufacturers.25 When negotiating formulary placement and drug 
pricing, manufacturers typically pay rebates to PBMs for increases in 
market share and use of their products.26 The higher the manufacturer 
sets the net gross cost of the drug, the higher the rebate the PBM 
receives.27 Hypothetically, these rebates are designed to lower the 
overall cost of drugs with the discounted price from the rebate being 
passed onto the consumer; this is hypothetical because PBMs do not 
have to reveal the amount of rebates they negotiate with drug 
manufacturers to the insurers on the other side of PBM contracts.28 The 
opaqueness of rebate rates has prompted widespread concern that 
PBMs may be keeping a portion of the rebates for their own financial 
benefit rather than passing on the incentive to the patient or retail 
pharmacy.29 
23 See id. 
24 CVS CAREMARK, supra note 20. 
25 Greg Radinsky, The Spotlight on PBMs: Federal Enforcement of the Anti-Kickback 
Statute on the Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry, 36 J. HEALTH L. 213, 218 
(2003). 
26 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, STUDY OF PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFIT 
MANAGEMENT 9 (2001), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/ 
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Reports/downloads/cms_2001_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Z4GZ-4ZFG]. 
27 Jonathan D. Rockoff, Behind the Push to Keep Higher-Priced EpiPen in Consumers’ 
Hands, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2017, 5:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-the-
push-to-keep-higher-priced-epipen-in-consumers-hands-1502036741 [https://perma.cc/ 
D3D9-PZVR]. 
28 Id. 
29 Hemphill, supra note 14, at 16. 
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As an example of a suspicious rebate, from 2011 to 2016 the 
manufacturer’s list price for the insulin known as Humalog more than 
doubled to $254.80 per vial.30 However, after paying out rebates to the 
PBMs that listed the drug, the manufacturer collected less revenue at 
the higher list price than at the previous lower price.31 The 
manufacturer’s explanation for the phenomenon of higher list prices 
with no corresponding increase in net profit is that PBMs demanded 
higher rebates.32 The PBMs also keep their administrative fee, paid by 
manufacturers for administrative tasks PBMs perform, which is based 
on a percentage of the list price.33 
Although the Humalog insulin example demonstrates the correlating 
rise in PBM revenue from rebates and the increase in drug costs, PBMs 
maintain that the drug manufacturers are the entities that actually raise 
the cost of the drugs.34 However, although PBMs may not explicitly 
demand that drug manufacturers raise the net price of their drugs, the 
manufacturers know that an increased price, which allows for an 
increased rebate and administrative fee, will lead to better placement 
on the PBM’s formulary. Because manufacturers want PBMs to assign 
them better formulary placements than their direct competitors in order 
to have manufacturers’ drugs prescribed to more patients, 
manufacturers will raise the list price of the drugs in order to increase 
the possible rebate amount. After purchase by a consumer, the rebate 
is then mailed to the patient’s plan sponsor, such as an employer or the 
government, and the drug price is thereby reduced for the insurer. 
However, this means that any rebate applied to a drug does not directly 
benefit consumers at the pharmacy, but ideally provides benefits to 
consumers by lowering their overall premiums. 
Regardless of the way rebates are characterized by other healthcare 
stakeholders, PBMs claim, in comments made on pending regulations, 
that rebates are an unavoidable result of antitrust lawsuits against drug 
manufacturers in the 1990s.35 Prior to the lawsuits, drug manufacturers 
30 Roland & Loftus, supra note 5. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Jacklyn Wille, CVS, Express Scripts Sued Over EpiPen Pricing, BLOOMBERG LAW 
(June 5, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employee-benefits/cvs-express-
scripts-sued-over-epipen-pricing [https://perma.cc/7YCZ-VP9C]. 
35 PHARMACEUTICAL CARE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST 
CONSIDERATIONS OF PROPOSALS TO LIMIT REBATES (2018), https://www.pcmanet.org/wp-
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offered discounts on drugs to preferred classes of customers such as 
hospitals, health maintenance plans, mail-order companies, and other 
companies with large customer bases.36 This is in contrast to the current 
system, where manufacturers do not directly give discounts to these 
parties, but pass along cost savings by negotiating rebates with PBMs. 
Pharmacies alleged that while they were stuck paying full price for 
drugs, manufacturers would make contracts with favored customers 
who enjoyed large market shares. Those contracts allowed such 
customers to purchase drugs at a discounted rate from wholesalers, and 
the manufacturers would then reimburse the wholesalers.37  
Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit found that this type of price 
discrimination, made possible by the manufacturers’ power to raise 
drug prices above the cost charged for some customers without losing 
customers, was evidence of the manufacturers’ monopoly power.38 
Manufacturers feared drawn-out litigation, as the court found merit in 
the early stages of the pharmacies’ claims and characterized 
manufacturers’ up-front discount practices as collusion among drug 
manufacturers to keep prices artificially high for some customers. 
Rather than continuing to fight through litigation, the drug 
manufacturers settled without admitting wrongdoing.39 As a part of the 
settlement with affected pharmacies, drug manufacturers were required 
to offer pharmacies the same discounts offered to customers with larger 
market shares and commit to ending two-tiered pricing driven by up-
front discounting.40 
The result of this case left a gap in the healthcare industry where 
manufacturers’ past methods of providing up-front discounts once 
stood. To fill the gap, manufacturers needed to find a way to still offer 
discounts to only those providers that had a large enough patient base 
to make the discounts profitable.41 In place of up-front discounts, 
content/uploads/2018/07/Legal-Analysis_-Antitrust-Considerations-of-Proposals-to-Limit-
Rebates.pdf [https://perma.cc/G66W-S6WR] [hereinafter PCMA]. 
36 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Edwin McDowell, Judge Agrees to Settlement in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 
1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/22/business/judge-agrees-to-settlement-in-drug-
case.html [https://perma.cc/QB5M-75YF]. 
40 Id. 
41 Katie Gudiksen, A Drug Rebate’s Tale: How a Class Action Lawsuit in the 90s Shaped 
Drug Pricing, SOURCE ON HEALTHCARE PRICE & COMPETITION: THE SOURCE BLOG (Feb. 
24, 2018), http://sourceonhealthcare.org/a-drug-rebates-tale-how-a-class-action-lawsuit-in-
the-1990s-shaped-drug-pricing [https://perma.cc/F938-VZF9]. 
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manufacturers moved to offering back-end rebates through PBMs. 
Manufacturers give these rebates after dispensing pharmacies verify 
that government and commercial insurance plans have met certain 
volume of sales requirements.42 Thus, manufacturers avoid antitrust 
concerns by hypothetically offering uniform rebates to any payer 
regardless of size, but can continue actually granting rebates only to 
preferred, large payers by awarding rebates to insurance companies 
only after they demonstrate a threshold amount of drug sales for a 
particular drug of the manufacturer.43  
Thus, although the rebate system has evolved into the modern-day 
system of opaque and intricate back-end discounts on drugs, PBMs 
continue to argue that rebates are the only way to discount drugs 
following the antitrust litigation.44 With up-front discounts banned by 
the terms of the PBMs’ settlement, PBMs argue that rebates are the 
only substitution that ensures some way of negotiating lower drug 
prices with manufacturers.45 
C. Federal Enforcement Mechanisms 
Following the Seventh Circuit’s decision, which drew attention to 
the enduring secretive nature of PBMs even after the move away from 
up-front discounts, the federal government has undertaken several 
initiatives to further reform the rebate system. 
1. Prior Legislative Initiatives
In recent years, there has been increased federal attention on
mechanisms available to hold healthcare companies accountable for 
opaque rebate arrangements. For instance, in 2009 the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) created the Health Care Fraud 
Prevention and Action Team initiative to reduce fraud or hidden 
arrangements in the Medicare and Medicaid systems.46  
Through this initiative, allegations by the Department of Justice of 
PBMs violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) have led to multiple 
42 PCMA, supra note 35.  
43 Gudiksen, supra note 41. 
44 PCMA, supra note 35. 
45 Id. 
46 Martha M. Rumore & F. Randy Vogenberg, PBM P&T Practices: The HEAT 
Initiative Is Gaining Momentum, 42 HEALTH CARE & L. 330, 330 (2017). 
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settlements with PBMs.47 Via the False Claim Act,48 these suits 
generally alleged that while providing drugs for Medicaid and 
Medicare, PBMs negotiated rebate agreements with manufacturers in 
exchange for primary formulary status and did not disclose these 
rebates to the government. These private financial agreements were 
considered a kickback.49  
More recent legislative initiatives have gone beyond these efforts 
focused on individual PBM transactions as violations of the AKS and 
have criticized all PBM-induced manufacturer rebates as a potential 
form of kickback prohibited by the federal AKS as a class.50  
2. The Anti-Kickback Statute
The federal AKS makes it illegal for any company to “knowingly
and willfully” solicit, receive, offer, or pay “any remuneration 
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly” in 
return for the referral of patients or purchasing, leasing, or arranging or 
recommending the purchase or lease of items or services reimbursable 
by Medicare or any other federal healthcare program.51 Any company 
found guilty of these AKS offenses can be fined up to $100,000 per 
violation.52 
According to the current Department of Health and Human Services, 
Congress’s intent behind using the term “remuneration” was to 
encompass the transfer of anything of value whatsoever.53 This 
includes payments made discretely or in the open and all types of 
payments, including both cash and in-kind.54 However, because of the 
broad reach of the statute and concern that the wording would capture 
innocent commercial transactions, Congress later mandated the 
formulation of safe harbor provisions to specify certain business 
transactions that would not be subject to sanctions under the act.55 
The safe harbors describe payments and business practices that may 
potentially be implicated by Anti-Kickback rules, but that Congress has 
47 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, ASTRAZENECA TO PAY $7.9 MILLION 
TO RESOLVE KICKBACK ALLEGATIONS (2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/astra 
zeneca-pay-79-million-resolve-kickback-allegations [https://perma.cc/P8GV-NVVJ]. 
48 Id. 
49 Rumore & Vogenberg, supra note 46.  
50 Radinsky, supra note 25, at 219. 
51 42 U.S.C. § 1320(b)(1)–(2) (2018). 
52 Id. § 1320(b)(2). 
53 Removal of Safe Harbor Protection, 84 Fed. Reg. at 2345. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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decided not to treat as offenses under the statute.56 Transactions that do 
not fall under a specific safe harbor are not automatically illegal, but 
are more likely to be considered an impermissible kickback.57  
Currently, the AKS contains five limited exceptions to activities 
potentially classified as kickbacks: (1) a properly disclosed discount; 
(2) certain payments from an employer to employee; (3) amounts paid 
to certain purchasing agents; (4) waivers of coinsurance under Part B; 
and (5) remunerations in a risk-sharing arrangement.58 The statute also 
provides an exception for any payment practice specified by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services in regulations.59 
Since the AKS was established prior to Congress involving the 
federal government in the purchase of prescription drugs via the 
Medicare Part D program, the AKS does not directly address the 
purchase of prescription drugs or the use of rebates.60 Although PBMs 
and the rebates they use do not directly fall under existing safe harbor 
exceptions, rebates between insurance plans, including government-
run Medicare plans, have been impliedly permitted by federal law 
because the rebates are not expressly barred under the AKS.61  
3. The Discount Safe Harbor
Up until the current administration,62 PBM rebates have been
presumed by the healthcare industry to be analogous to the “discount” 
safe harbor and thereby allowable under federal law.63 The discount 
safe harbor allows for discounts on an item or service for which 
payment may be made on behalf of a federal healthcare program.64 A 
“discount” is defined as a “reduction in the amount a buyer . . . is 
56 Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Safe 
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding 
Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,368, 88,368 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 1001). 
57 Radinsky, supra note 25, at 222. 
58 42 U.S.C. § 1320(b)(3) (2018). 
59 Id. § 1320(b)(3)(E). 
60 Removal of Safe Harbor Protection, 84 Fed. Reg. at 2346.  
61 Stephanie Armour & Joseph Walker, Trump Administration Moves to Curb Drug 
Rebates in Medicare, Medicaid, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2019, 7:34 PM), https://www.wsj. 
com/articles/u-s-proposes-curbing-drug-rebates-in-some-medicare-medicaid-plans-
11548971322?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=4 [https://perma.cc/X2GU-4VMS]. 
62 Removal of Safe Harbor Protection, 84 Fed. Reg. at 2343. 
63 Radinsky, supra note 25, at 223. 
64 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h) (2018). 
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charged for an item or service . . . .”65 Discounts cannot include cash 
payments, but include “rebates,” defined as a discount whose terms are 
“fixed and disclosed in writing to the buyer at the time of the initial 
purchase to which the discount applies, but which is not given at the 
time of sale.”66 In order for a discount to be protected under the safe 
harbor, it must be earned based on purchases of the same good, claimed 
in the same fiscal year in which the discount was earned, and the buyer 
must fully and accurately report the discount in the fiscal year in which 
the discount is earned.67  
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has released guidance that 
a tiered, percentage-based rebate program—similar to the structure of 
PBM rebates—would be covered by the discount safe harbor.68 The 
OIG reasoned that where the discount on one product was not 
contingent on the purchase of another product, the discount would be 
dependent on items purchased.69 This rebate structure would then 
permissibly constitute a rebate because the terms are set out at the time 
of purchase, even though the rebate is redeemed at a later date.70 
The structure of PBM rebates does not directly qualify under the 
discount safe harbor because PBMs do not directly buy drugs from the 
manufacturers. Instead, health insurance providers purchase the drugs 
directly from the manufacturers. Indeed, Alex Azar, the current 
Secretary of HHS, has expressly declared that he does not believe the 
discount safe harbor covers rebates.71  
If PBM rebates are not covered by the discount safe harbor, such 
rebates will be subject to sanctions under the AKS. To combat this new 
interpretation, going forward, PBMs could highlight previous 
administrations’ acceptance of their practices under the AKS and argue 
their structure of rebates is very similar to the percentage-based rebates 
approved by the OIG. Additionally, PBMs could adhere closely to the 
reporting requirements imposed on discounts and proactively report the 
specific rebates they receive from manufacturers. As the current 
Federal Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner, Scott Gottlieb, has 
65 Id. § 1001.952(h)(5). 
66 Id. § 1001.952(h)(4). 
67 Id. § 1001.952(h)(1)(ii). 
68 Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office of Inspector Gen., Opinion Letter on No. 13-
07, 2 (July 1, 2013), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2013/advopn13-07. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP7F-GEJX] [hereinafter Opinion Letter]. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 6. 
71 Removal of Safe Harbor Protection, 84 Fed. Reg. at 2340. 
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repeatedly stressed in speeches, one of the healthcare community’s 
largest issues with PBMs is the lack of transparency regarding whether 
or not the entire rebate is being passed on to consumers.72 By 
proactively adhering as closely as possible to the existing transparency 
requirements, PBMs may effectively argue their rebate structure should 
similarly be protected. 
II 
RECENT FEDERAL ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE 
SAFE HARBOR APPLICABILITY 
Following up on his campaign promise to bring down drug prices,73 
President Trump has focused aspects of his strategy on undoing the 
rebate system that PBMs rely on. Following the President’s Council of 
Economic Advisors’ criticism of the significant market power and 
opaqueness of the PBM industry, in February 2018 the Health and 
Human Services Agency released regulations aimed at breaking up the 
PBM industry.74  
The administration signaled its intent to drastically alter the rebate 
system in May 2016 when the HHS released a request for information 
(RFI) entitled, “HHS Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices and Reduce Out-
of-Pocket Costs.”75 Within the RFI, HHS relied on the premise that 
“[i]ncreasingly higher rebates in Federal health care programs may be 
causing higher list prices in public programs, and increasing the prices 
paid by consumers.”76 HHS sought comments directly on the impact of 
rebates on drug pricing, asking, “What incentives or regulatory changes 
(e.g., removing the discount safe harbor) could restrict the use of 
rebates and reduce the effect of rebates on list prices?”77 
72 Angelica LaVito, FDA Commissioner to Drug Middlemen: You’re Part of the 
Problem, CNBC (Apr. 19, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/19/fda-
commissioner-to-drug-middlemen-youre-part-of-the-problem.html [https://perma.cc/ 
EGP3-TMUY]. 
73 Kerry Close, Donald Trump’s New Promise: I Will ‘Bring Down Drug Prices,’ 
MONEY (Dec. 7, 2016, 12:36 PM), http://time.com/money/4593536/donald-trump-person- 
of-the-year-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/3K3B-N5YW]. 
74 David Dayen, Trump Eliminates the Middleman, AM. PROSPECT (July 27, 2018), 
http://prospect.org/article/trump-eliminates-middleman [https://perma.cc/26C6-W2KQ]. 
75 HHS Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices, 83 Fed. Reg. 22,692 (published May 16, 2018). 
76 Id. at 22,698. 
77 Id. 
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The RFI then signaled the myriad of routes future regulations may 
take with a series of questions designed to elicit responses from across 
the healthcare industry:  
(1)  Do PBM rebates and fees based on the percentage of the list price 
create an incentive to favor higher list prices (and the potential 
for higher rebates) rather than lower prices?;  
(2)  Do higher rebates encourage benefits consultants who represent 
payers to focus on high rebates instead of low net cost?; . . .  
(3)  What effect would imposing [a] fiduciary duty on PBMs on 
behalf of the ultimate payer (i.e., consumers) have on PBMs’ 
ability to negotiate drug prices?; . . .  
(4)  Should Medicare Part D prohibit the use of rebates in contracts 
. . . to be based only on a fixed price for a drug over the contract 
term?78 
The Administration accompanied the RFI with the release of 
“American Patients First: The Trump Administration Blueprint to 
Lower Drug Prices and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs.”79 Of the four 
main sections and goals, the “Incentives for Lower List Prices” section 
included both short- and long-term proposed regulations.80 The AKS 
was specifically targeted under the “further opportunit[y]” of enacting 
“[m]easures to restrict the use of rebates, including revisiting the safe 
harbor under the Anti-Kickback statute for drug rebates.”81 When 
placing blame on portions of the healthcare industry for higher drug 
costs, HHS depicted a “sophisticated PBM industry demanding higher 
rebates and restricting access to markets” with the effect of “boost[ing] 
the prices paid by payers and, especially, consumers.”82 
The formal proposed rule was released in February 2019.83 
Following a statement that the current Secretary does not believe the 
current discount safe harbor applies to PBM rebates, the rule proposes 
to cement that view and overturn years of industry understanding by 
explicitly excluding from the definition of eligible discounts the rebates 
78 Id. 
79 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AMERICAN PATIENTS FIRST: THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION BLUEPRINT TO LOWER DRUG PRICES AND REDUCE OUT-OF-POCKET 
COSTS (2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/AmericanPatientsFirst.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZS8U-QY3K]. 
80 Id. at 11. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 15. 
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paid by manufacturers to plan sponsors as negotiated by PBMs.84 To 
replace the status quo of the PBM rebate process, the proposed rule also 
adds two additional safe harbors related directly to pharmaceutical drug 
pricing.85  
The first proposed safe harbor, to be known as “Point-of-Sale 
Reductions in Price for Prescription Pharmaceutical Products,” seeks 
to protect price reductions offered by drug manufacturers. These price 
reductions are embedded into the drug’s price at the point of sale to the 
consumer, rather than offered as a rebate that is processed through the 
health plan or PBM.86 In order to be eligible for the new Point-of-Sale 
safe harbor, the reduction in price must be set in advance and fixed and 
disclosed in writing to the health insurance company.87 Once again, the 
safe harbor explicitly requires that the reduction in price cannot take 
the form of a rebate, and it must be completely reflected in the price 
charged to the patient at the point of sale.88 
The second proposed safe harbor protects PBM service fees from 
liability under the AKS.89 This “service fee” safe harbor would 
explicitly allow payment of flat fees to PBMs for administrative 
services that PBMs currently provide for manufacturers, such as 
preventing duplicate discounts, or tasks that depend on or use data 
gathered by PBMs from their health plan customers.90 The service fee 
safe harbor also explicitly covers flat fees for contracting with 
pharmacies, establishing payment levels for pharmacies, negotiating 
rebate arrangements, and developing and managing preferred drug lists 
and formularies.91 To ensure that the service fee proposal remains 
distinct from any hidden rebates, the service agreements must be in 
writing, be consistent with fair market value, be a fixed payment rather 
84 Id. at 2343 (noting that while the proposed rule is limited to plan sponsors under 
Medicare and Medicaid due to limits on agency power, federal legislation has been proposed 
in Congress to extend the proposed rule to private healthcare plans and their contracted 
PBMs. S. 657, 116th Cong. (2019). This Comment proceeds under the assumption that these 
restrictions will also eventually apply to private health plans via the accompanying federal 
legislation). 
85 Removal of Safe Harbor Protection, 84 Fed. Reg. at 2344. 
86 Id. at 2348. 
87 Id. at 2349. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 2340. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 2350. 
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than a percentage of sales, and not be determined in a manner that takes 
into account the volume or value of any referrals.92 
As a whole, this proposed scheme would transform the current 
system for reducing drug prices from a rebate-dependent system to one 
that encourages negotiation of up-front discounts. Rather than spread 
savings out to everyone via lower health plan premiums, up-front 
discounts would apply directly to the consumer at the time of purchase. 
Practically, a system based on negotiated discounts rather than rebates 
would transform the PBM industry to one that functions more like 
a group purchasing organization combined with a benefits 
administrator.93  
This function change attempts to accomplish the government’s goal 
of detaching payments and contracts within the healthcare industry 
from the list prices of drugs, with the ultimate goal of disincentivizing 
raising list prices of drugs to increase rebate and profit levels.94 
Therefore, although the physical drug distribution system would 
remain unchanged, compensation of intermediaries, such as payments 
to manufacturers and pharmacies, would be based on per-prescription 
fees instead of drug prices later reduced by rebates based on the total 
volume of sales.95  
Under the proposed regulations, formulary placement would also no 
longer incentivize raising list prices to enable higher rebates. Instead, 
when PBMs consider formulary placement of drugs, the only 
differentiator would be the net prices of drugs. Therefore, any discounts 
to drugs to influence formulary placement would have to be made up 
front, which also contributes to the new goal of passing discounts along 
to patients at the time of purchase. 
However, on July 11, 2019, President Trump announced his decision 
to rescind the proposed PBM rebate reform.96 Following an aggressive 
lobbying campaign from PBMs and a disagreement between HHS 
Secretary Azar and Trump cabinet officials on the merits of the rule, 
92 Id. 
93 ADAM J. FEIN, A SYSTEM WITHOUT REBATES: THE DRUG CHANNELS NEGOTIATED 
DISCOUNTS MODEL 4 (2018), http://www.drugchannelsinstitute.com/files/Drug_Channels_ 
NDM-Fein-02August2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU84-ST2U]. 
94 Removal of Safe Harbor Protection, 84 Fed. Reg. at 2341. 
95 FEIN, supra note 93, at 4. 
96 Stephanie Armour, Trump Administration Drops Plan to Curb Drug Rebates, 
WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-
drops-plan-to-curb-drug-rebates-11562845155?mod=hp_lead_pos7 https://perma.cc/FU84 
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the President rescinded the rebate rule with little explanation.97 
However, White House officials listed pending bipartisan legislation 
on PBM rebate reform as a reason the President rescinded the rule.98 
Senator Mike Braun also subsequently promised to introduce 
legislation ending rebates in the commercial market.99 The recently 
proposed HHS regulations amending the AKS are the most likely 
blueprint for these changes and any future efforts for reform of the 
PBM industry. 
III 
THE CASE FOR (SOMEWHAT) PRESERVING REBATES 
Although PBMs have been granted a reprieve from impending HHS 
regulations, the industry is under increasing scrutiny.100 At the 
beginning of 2019, three dozen drug manufacturers increased the cost 
of hundreds of drugs by an average of 6.3%.101 Following the increase 
in drug prices, Senator Susan Collins, as chair of the Senate Special 
Committee on Aging, blamed PBMs for the increase in list prices by 
requiring greater rebates.102 In a letter to HHS, Senator Collins urged 
HHS to quickly implement new regulations limiting the use of rebates 
as a way to “incentivize lower list prices.”103 
Regardless of where responsibility for increasing drug prices is 
allocated, PBMs have become a high-profile target for reform 
throughout both the executive and congressional branches and will 
most likely not escape this round of scrutiny by maintaining the status 
quo when it comes to how they administer rebates. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Sarah Owermohle, et al., Trump Leaning on Sanders-Style Ideas to Save His Drug 
Plan, POLITICO (July 11, 2019, 11:11 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/11/ 
white-house-drug-rebate-rule-1405884 [https://perma.cc/UC7K-P3VZ]. 
100 Jared S. Hopkins, Senator Collins Presses HHS to Reform Drug Rebate System, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2019, 2:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/senator-collins-
presses-hhs-to-reform-drug-rebate-system-11547139211?mod=hp_lista_pos4 [https:// 
perma.cc/S3W3-2F84] [hereinafter Senator Collins].  
101 Jared S. Hopkins, Drugmakers Raise Prices on Hundreds of Medicines, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 1, 2019, 9:13 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/drugmakers-raise-prices-on-
hundreds-of-medicines-11546389293?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/PU3U-PLRL] 
[hereinafter Drugmakers Raise Prices]. 
102 Senator Collins, supra note 100. 
103 Id.  
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Therefore, Part III of this Comment argues that PBMs should 
actively support congressional adjustments to their rebate practices in 
an effort to both appease federal regulators and protect the lower prices 
they fight to get for patients. However, I will also argue that both 
Congress and the executive branch should be temperate when crafting 
new regulations regarding PBM safe harbors, as completely denying 
protection of, or applicability to, PBM rebates could leave a market 
hole in negotiating consumer drug discounts that actually increases 
patients’ out-of-pocket costs. After examining attempts by states to 
regulate PBM practices, this Comment will argue that expedited and 
cohesive federal legislation is the appropriate path forward.  
A. Unintended Consequences 
Completely nixing rebates by modifying the AKS to directly exclude 
PBM rebates in the newly proposed rule, which HHS Secretary Azar 
has touted as a cure-all solution to rising drug costs,104 would send a 
powerful signal to the healthcare industry. Since rebates and drugs’ 
corresponding placement on formularies form the heart of how 
prescription drugs are priced and distributed in this country, the entire 
healthcare industry, following the new irrelevance of PBMs, would 
have to be restructured.105 This drastic restructuring would accomplish 
many policy makers’ goal of sending a signal to the drug industry that 
arbitrary increases in drug prices are no longer an acceptable status quo. 
However, ending rebates and the negotiating power of PBMs would 
also leave drug pricing power entirely with drug manufacturers 
themselves.  
Although manufacturers frequently insist they raise list prices only 
to accommodate PBMs’ demands for ever-increasing rebates,106 the 
role PBMs play as the point of negotiation with manufacturers over list 
prices is currently the main mechanism of pushback against 
manufacturer prices. The unique nature of the prescription drug 
marketplace, where consumers are forced to buy a product based on 
health needs rather than shopping around for the best deal, means that 
without PBMs manufacturers will not face the same pressure as other 
104 Angelica LaVito, Trump’s Health Chief Intensifies Attack on Drug Middlemen, 
Suggests Getting Rid of Rebates, CNBC (June 12, 2018, 6:02 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/06/12/hhs-secretary-azar-outlines-trump-administrations-drug-pricing-plan.html 
[https://perma.cc/NJH6-CLUX] [hereinafter Trump’s Health]. 
105 Id. 
106 Roland & Loftus, supra note 5. 
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businesses in a free market economy to lower prices and entice 
demand.  
PBMs’ crucial role in negotiating drug prices was previously 
confirmed by the most recent comprehensive government study 
available, which concluded that PBM rebates do significantly lower 
drug prices for consumers.107 In a study of PBMs effectiveness at 
lowering the drug costs of federal employees, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) found that PBMs obtained an average price of drugs for 
retail pharmacies that was 18% below the average price paid by cash-
paying customers for fourteen selected brand-name drugs.108 The GAO 
also found PBM rebates were responsible for a 47% decrease in the 
price of a selection of generic drugs.109 When PBM-operated mail-in 
pharmacies were used, the cost savings increased to 27% and 53% for 
brand-name and generic drugs, respectively.110  
More recently, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) reported that the rebates offered by manufacturers were set to 
increase significantly in 2018.111 However, the CMS also concluded 
that these increased rebates were also “a major reason for decreases in 
overall Part D [(the federal prescription drug program)] costs when 
compared” to the CMS report from 2017.112 Therefore, even according 
to a government report on increasing rebates, the rebates were found to 
significantly benefit patients. 
The Federal Trade Commission has also found that PBMs did pass 
along a significant portion of rebates from manufacturers to 
consumers.113 Depending on the size of the PBM and whether the PBM 
107 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-196, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ 
HEALTH BENEFITS: EFFECTS OF USING PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS ON  
HEALTH PLANS, ENROLLEES, AND PHARMACIES 9 (2003), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/ 
236828.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FYC-7HRZ]. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
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111 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAL SERVICES, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL 
SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 143 (2018), https://www.cms.gov/ 
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/ 
Downloads/TR2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/536P-XN7G]. 
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ORDER PHARMACIES 59 (2005), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmacy-benefit-managers-
ownership-mail-order-pharmacies-federal-trade-commission-report [https://perma.cc/ 
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was insurer-owned, PBMs passed along an average of 25% to 91% of 
rebates negotiated with manufacturers.114 This shows that although 
some PBMs do retain a portion of rebates, consumers are indeed paying 
a lower price when using a PBM-negotiated plan than those consumers 
using cash payments.  
Therefore, although banning rebates entirely is a policy change that 
would likely resonate with fed-up consumers and be an effective 
takedown of an opaque and confusing PBM industry, it does not make 
sense to gut a system that government regulators have found financially 
benefits consumers in a significant way. Restricting rebates will 
completely demolish the leveraging and negotiating power that PBMs 
employ to achieve lower drug costs.  
With no negotiating power, a market without PBMs will lead to the 
more likely possibility of tacit collusion among manufacturers to set 
high prices and would do nothing to increase price competition.115 
These anticompetitive consequences of explicitly excluding PBM 
rebates from the AKS would leave a vacuum in drug pricing 
negotiations. Although public and political anger over drug pricing 
could serve as a limiting factor for manufacturers, there is no natural 
successor to PBMs to consistently and formally sit down with 
manufacturers to negotiate lower prices or rebates.  
B. Working Within the Anti-Kickback Statute:  
Detangling Administrative Fees from List Prices 
Given the limited free market regulating forces present without 
PBMs and the proven cost-saving effects of PBM rebates, it may be a 
more advantageous policy to work within the existing enforcement 
mechanism of the federal Anti-Kickback statute. By adjusting the 
existing statutory and regulatory framework, Congress could more 
closely regulate the opaque aspects of the PBM industry while still 
encouraging the negotiating function of PBMs that actually saves 
consumers money at the pharmacy. 
As explained above, the current safe harbor most applicable to the 
PBM rebate system is the discount safe harbor. However, this safe 
harbor does not adequately encompass PBMs because PBMs do not 
directly purchase the drugs from the manufacturer, and the safe harbor 
114 Id. 
115 Patricia M. Danzon, Pharmacy Benefit Management: Are Reporting Requirements 
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provides that the discount must be provided at the time of the sale of 
the good.116  
Overall, when creating this existing discount safe harbor, Congress 
intended to encourage some level of competitive behavior that 
ultimately benefitted federal health programs.117 The goal of the 
adjustment to the safe harbor law to allow for PBM rebates should be 
similar: as much of the negotiated rebate as possible should be passed 
through to the consumer. Although maintaining PBMs is necessary to 
preclude anticompetitive behavior by manufacturers, changes must be 
made to the rebate system to avoid negotiations over list prices and 
rebates that do not consider costs to the consumer.118  
To encourage honest behavior by PBMs and increase transparency, 
the government should encourage good faith drug pricing that is not 
focused on raising the list price of the drug to maximize PBM profits. 
To accomplish this goal, the new safe harbor regulations should follow 
the pioneering approaches of the private sector discussed below and 
detangle allowable rebates or discounts from the fees PBMs receive for 
the administrative services provided to parties across the 
pharmaceutical supply chain.  
1. Lessons from the Private Sector: A Case Analysis of Caterpillar
Inc. 
For example, when Caterpillar, a construction and mining 
equipment manufacturer, experienced a doubling of its prescription 
drug costs from the 1990s to the early 2000s, the company examined 
excessive bloat in their pharmaceutical supply chain expenses.119 As a 
company that spends more than $160 million per year on 
pharmaceuticals for more than 150,000 employees and dependents,120 
the resulting methodology Caterpillar implemented to lower its 
expenditures can serve as a model for larger-scale implementation. 
Caterpillar first focused on clearly separating the administrative fees 
that PBMs charge from the list price of drugs. One of the ways PBMs 
make a profit, and therefore one of the major sources of costs to an 
116 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h)(1)(iii)(A) (2018). 
117 Opinion Letter, supra note 68, at 4. 
118 Roland & Loftus, supra note 5. 
119 John Carroll, Having Mined Gold in Pharmacy Deal, Caterpillar Sets Sights on 
Gold-Standard Therapies, 6 BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 49, 49 (2009). 
120 Id. 
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insurance payer such as Caterpillar, is by charging administrative fees 
for some of their services.121 PBMs charge these fees on handling drug 
transactions as the middleman on both ends of their contracts, to both 
insurance plan sponsors (such as companies like Caterpillar) and the 
pharmacies that provide drugs to the plan sponsors.122 Adding to the 
hidden nature of these administrative fees and the inability to challenge 
these administrative fees as excessive, both insurance payers and 
pharmacies that contract with each other via a PBM are unable to learn 
what is the other’s respective reimbursement rate on a drug 
transaction.123  
This administrative fee is labeled as a contracted reimbursement and 
is based on a percentage of the total price of each drug, rather than 
being directly tied to the administrative services performed by the 
PBM.124 Thus, increasing manufacturer list prices, which PBMs have 
been shown to drive up using rebates, are contractually tied to PBM 
administrative fees. Manufacturers pay PBMs for certain services using 
PBMs’ sales data, such as preventing double discounts and monitoring 
medication usage.125 These fees are often calculated as a percentage of 
the list price of particular drugs or the volume of drugs sold and are 
often compensated at a rate above fair market price.126 As detailed in 
Part I of this Comment, some stakeholders and commentators are 
concerned that a direct link between PBM administrative fees and the 
list price of a drug incentivizes PBMs to drive up the list price of a drug. 
Driving up the list price subsequently increases the amount PBMs 
realize, returned as their administrative fee for handling transactions 
between manufacturers, payers, and pharmacies.127 
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122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Removal of Safe Harbor Protection, 84 Fed. Reg. at 2344.
126 Id.
127 Press Release, PhRMA, Biopharmaceutical Industry Takes Bold New Policy
Position on How Payments Should Work in Supply Chain (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.phrma.org/Press-Release/Biopharmaceutical-Industry-Takes-Bold-New-
Policy-Position-on-How-Payments-Should-Work [https://perma.cc/WX4A-4C3R]. See 
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After identifying PBM administrative fees based on drug list price 
as a major source of the waste in the company’s drug supply chain, 
Caterpillar set out to form a unique contract arrangement that bypassed 
the need for a significant portion of its PBM’s administrative fee and 
established a baseline for the fee that was independent of the 
manufacturer’s wholesale price.128  
2. Lessons from the Private Sector: Contracting Around PBMs
First, Caterpillar went around its existing PBM and the typical PBM-
driven pharmacy selection process and directly contracted with Wal-
Mart’s pharmacy to provide the generic drug portion of their benefits 
to employees.129 By directly approaching a pharmacy to cover a 
significant portion of its employee’s drug needs, Caterpillar 
successfully eliminated the need to pay a PBM for finding a pharmacy 
and the per-drug-transaction cost of the PBM’s reimbursement 
administrative fee. Instead, Caterpillar directly paid Wal-Mart’s 
pharmacy for the drug costs.130  
Second, Caterpillar lowered the cost it pays to the pharmacy by 
modifying the cost basis of prescription drugs from the pre-existing 
standard of the average wholesale price (AWP) to establish that Wal-
Mart will reimburse the pharmacy only for the exact cost of the drugs 
to Wal-Mart.131 By basing the company’s reimbursement costs on the 
real invoice cost and eliminating the administrative fee associated with 
the PBM handling the transaction, Caterpillar lowered the overall cost 
of drugs to its company and employees. To ensure that Wal-Mart did 
not inflate its reimbursement cost, as PBMs do by basing the 
reimbursement fee on the AWP, Caterpillar negotiated for an option to 
use a third-party auditor.132 With this option, Caterpillar can request an 
independent audit to ensure that only the actual cost of drugs is passed 
along to its company. Finally, with a lower overhead cost, Caterpillar 
eliminated the need for co-pays by its employees for generic drugs.133 
128 Peter Pitts, The Big Cat Finds ROI Where the Sun Don’t Shine, drugwonks.com 
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3. Lessons from the Private Sector: Preserving a Role for PBMs
Caterpillar’s practices also demonstrate that detangling
administrative fees from the list price is a solution that could also be 
beneficial to PBMs. While adding additional transparent PBM 
practices, basing administrative fees on fair market value does not 
completely eliminate the need for a PBM, as proposed government 
regulations may. Caterpillar’s PBM will still negotiate drug prices and 
pharmacy supply chains for nongeneric drugs, such as brand-name 
drugs without a generic option that Wal-Mart could not supply.134 This 
assures PBMs that uncoupling administrative fees from the list price of 
drugs will not completely undermine the need for PBMs, while also 
ultimately leading to lower prices for consumers.  
When formulating a safe harbor similar to the discount safe harbor 
to encompass a PBM rate structure, HHS should incorporate a 
provision that codifies lessons learned from Caterpillar’s decoupling of 
its PBM’s fee from the drug list price, similar to the proposed PBM 
service fee safe harbor. The hypothetical “PBM rebate” safe harbor 
should include a provision requiring a similar bifurcated structure that 
separates administrative fees from the list price of drugs. While the new 
safe harbor should allow PBMs to continue negotiating drug prices and 
establishing pathways for delivery of drugs to the consumer—the 
aspects most beneficial for cost savings to the consumer—the safe 
harbor should explicitly prohibit fees based on the list price of the drug. 
Instead, administrative fees should be based on the scope of services 
offered by the PBM to its various clients. A flat administrative fee 
should be established up front in the PBM’s contract. With this 
structure, PBMs’ administrative fees would be statutorily required to 
be independent of both manufacturer drug list prices and the ultimate 
volume of drugs consumed by patients, thereby also reducing the 
relevance of rebates.  
Additionally, as included in the current discount safe harbor, the 
PBM rebate safe harbor could be formulated to include additional 
transparency requirements focused on rebates. Discounts or rebates 
under the current discount safe harbor must be “fixed and disclosed in 
writing to the buyer at the time of the initial sale of the good or 
service.”135 Similarly, a new PBM rebate safe harbor could include a 
requirement that the amount of manufacturer rebates received by a 
PBM must be disclosed at the beginning of a contract.  
134 Id. 
135 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h)(1)(iii)(A) (2018). 
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PBMs may have concerns with this requirement. Wal-Mart 
expressed concerns that Caterpillar’s independent auditor provision 
revealed too much proprietary pricing information to the other entities 
Wal-Mart contracted with. To counter this concern, the regulations 
could take yet another note from Caterpillar’s experiment. For instance, 
the regulations could provide that although the amount of rebates 
negotiated with manufacturers must be available to other parties 
necessary for the transaction, such as payers and pharmacies, the merit 
of the rebate (and any subsequent increases) can be evaluated by an 
independent and confidential third party. This arrangement would 
prevent the release of contracted prices and preserve PBMs’ 
negotiating power.  
However, the transparency provisions in a hypothetical PBM rebate 
safe harbor should not extend as far as the proposed PBM service fee 
safe harbor does.136 Within HHS’s proposed PBM service fee safe 
harbor, the agency considers requiring PBMs, among others, to 
disclose information about valuation and valuation methodology to 
HHS.137 In a competitive industry, where PBMs compete against each 
other to get rebates or discounts from manufacturers, disclosing 
valuation information to HHS may put PBMs at a disadvantage with 
drug manufacturers if the manufacturer discovers, via the information 
released to HHS, that another PBM requires lesser discounts for better 
formulary placements. Therefore, even under HHS’ proposed 
framework for up-front discounts, these extensive transparency 
requirements pertaining to valuation methodology may undermine the 
ultimate goal of obtaining lower list prices for consumers.  
However, there are private sector practices that safe harbor 
requirements could incorporate to improve transparency in the PBM 
industry. These include rebate transparency requirements, bifurcation 
standards for administrative fees, and list prices in an Anti-Kickback 
statute modification. Implementing these practices could be a viable 
approach to assuage many legislators’ and consumers’ concerns 
regarding the opaque nature of current PBM drug pricing practices.138  
Further, contrary to HHS Secretary Azar’s preferred scorched-earth 
policy of amending the AKS to completely ban the rebate system,139 
136 See Removal of Safe Harbor Protection, 84 Fed. Reg. at 2350. 
137 Id. 
138 Senator Collins, supra note 100.  
139 Trump’s Health, supra note 104.  
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incorporating these modifications preserves the proven cost-saving 
aspects of PBM practices, such as acting as a moderating force for drug 
prices set by manufacturers. Modifying the AKS to accommodate and 
more closely regulate PBM practices—rather than eliminating the safe 
harbors—may not be the most politically expedient way for members 
of Congress to show their constituents they are being tough on the 
pharmaceutical industry, but this approach keeps the consumer’s best 
interest in mind and encourages the lowest possible drug prices. 
C. State Regulation of PBMs 
States’ attempts at regulation of the PBM industry, beginning in the 
early 2010s, also pose a danger of inconsistent regulation and harm to 
drug prices and make the case for a federal modification to PBM 
regulation even more urgent. A combination of states’ limited ability 
to influence largely federally regulated drug prices and states’ 
legislatures’ desire to appear as if they are proactively combating 
prescription drug prices has led to a focus on states’ abilities to license 
PBMs operating in their states—an aspect of the drug industry they can 
control.140  
Beginning with Mississippi in 2011, and including Oregon in 
2013,141 states have begun to shift regulatory authority over PBMs, 
including licensing and annual submission of balance sheets and 
income statements, from neutral insurance commissions to possibly 
more biased state boards of pharmacies.142 This shift has sparked 
concern that pharmacies, as entities in direct competition with PBMs 
(who often operate their own pharmacies), will use this new regulatory 
power to undercut PBMs as their market adversaries.143 For example, 
the Mississippi Board of Pharmacy has subsequently issued a 
requirement that PBMs disclose sensitive financial information, which 
is to be shared with pharmacies in direct competition with PBMs.144  
This expanding practice of allowing regulatory boards composed of 
market participants to oversee their competitors has also alarmed the 
Federal Trade Commission, which warned the structure “may create 
140 Shepherd, supra note 16, at 12.  
141 OR. REV. STAT. § 735.532 (2018). 
142 Shepherd, supra note 16, at 13. 
143 Id. at 13–14. 
144 Id. at 18. 
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tensions and conflicts of interest” and ultimately reduce competition 
and increase prices in the pharmaceutical marketplace.145  
By imposing a structure of government-sanctioned adversarial 
oversight, states have shown that their ability to regulate PBMs is 
insufficient to adequately address the opaqueness of PBM practices 
while also preserving the lower drug prices PBMs create. The federal 
government and Congress should take these arguably failed 
experiments as confirmation of a broad and increasing desire to 
implement some sort of fix to PBM practices and as a warning that 
policies that too severely limit PBMs’ core practices will also not solve 
the actual problem at hand: rising drug costs. 
CONCLUSION 
PBMs are mostly obscure middlemen whose practices touch the 
lives and healthcare of more than 200 million Americans. Although 
PBMs’ negotiating power fills an important gap in the healthcare 
industry and serves as a check on the otherwise monopolistic power of 
pharmaceutical companies to determine drug pricing, the intricacies of 
their industry and the dangers resulting from a major lack of 
transparency have proven ripe for abuse by bad actors. By starting the 
process to amend the AKS and remove any safe harbor protections for 
PBM rebates, this administration and Congress have shown they are 
serious about addressing price gouging spurred by PBMs.  
However, while crafting policies to reign in PBMs, policymakers 
must keep in mind the good that PBMs work toward: actively lowering 
the cost to consumers for prescription drugs the consumers need to live. 
If policy decisions and modification of the AKS go too far and 
eliminate the aspects of PBMs that have been proven to increase access 
to affordable prescription drugs, American patients will have once 
again become forgotten pawns in the game of drug prices. By taking a 
moderate approach and modifying the AKS to increase oversight and 
regulation of PBMs, rather than entirely destroying the industry, 
Congress and regulators have a real chance to reform an industry gone 
145 Id. at 16; Letter from Susan S. DeSanti et al., Director Office of Policy Planning, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, et al., to Mark Formby, Representative, Mississippi House 
of Representatives 5 (Mar. 22, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-letter-honorable-mark-formby-mississippi-house-
representatives-concerning-mississippi/110322mississippipbm.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/L7VX-BP6G].  
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awry and take a large step toward making prescription drugs more 
affordable. 
